Story about Silebar and Bengkulu and the activities of the English there, 28 January 1696

Kapten John Macdonald, Bengal Engineer in front of Fort Marlborough, Bengkulu, 1794. Peter Archer, 1994.

Introduced Jeyamalar Kathirithamby-Wells

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Jeyamalar Kathirithamby-Wells,Report from the Minister of Banten Tsiely Godong and former translator of the English Harkis Baly concerning the English presence in Silebar and Bengkulu, West-Sumatra, 1696”. In: Harta Karun. Hidden Treasures on Indonesian and Asian-European History from the VOC Archives in Jakarta, document 12. Jakarta: Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, 2013.

 By Jeyamalar Kathirithamby-Welss

By the mid-sixteenth century, Bengkulu joined the rest of the west coast of Sumatra as a major exporter of pepper attracting the ambitions of the neighbouring state of Banten across the Sunda Straits. With the aim of augmenting its own pepper supplies, historians presume that Banten gained access to Sumatran pepper when Sultan Hasanuddin (r. 1552-70) married the daughter of the ruler of Inderapura, receiving as dowry all the coastal areas to the south. Subsequently, Tuan Pati Bangun Negara and Bangsa Radin, chiefs respectively of the Redjang-Lebong and Lemba of Sungai Lemau and Silebar, received the title of pangeran (prince, governor) from the Sultan of Banten. This is recorded by some copper plates dating back from 1668 (A.H. 1079).[1] Their empowerment was aimed, evidently, at securing their cooperation to boost Banten’s pepper supplies.

Years of Anglo-Dutch rivalry in Banten over the pepper deals with the local rulers culminated during an internal Bantenese power struggle in 1682. The outcome led to the withdrawal of the English East India Company from its factory there. Consequentely, the British had to search for an alternative access to the pepper market in Sumatra. Pre-empted by the VOC in Pariaman (north of Padang), the English East India Company turned to Bengkulu. Here, in July 1685, the Company signed a treaty with the pangeran of Sungai Lemau and Sungai Itam, gaining exclusive delivery of pepper at a fixed price of 12 dollars per bahar (fixed, later, at 560 pounds) and land for a settlement, upon which they raised the robust Fort Marlborough, which survives to this day.[2]

Though the Dutch in Banten – no less than the British in Bengkulu – were keen on avoiding hostilities, they had much to profit from a successful Bantenese challenge to British access to the pepper fields of west Sumatra. Thus, in December of 1685, prompted by the VOC to dislodge the British, Sultan Abu Nasr Abdul Kahar (r. 1682-7) sent to Silebar a 2-300 strong force conveyed by a Dutch fleet under the command of a jenang (representative/ambassador), Karia Sutra Gistra. The British position was saved by a combination of factors, principally, the pangerans’ flight to the hinterland; the outbreak of disease among the invading forces; and the lack of Dutch reinforcements which compelled the Bantenese withdrawal.[3] This left the British free to conclude a treaty with another local ruler, the pangeran of Silebar, who controlled the only safe anchorage for ships visiting the West Sumatran coast, at Pulau Bay.

Though in 1688 the British successfully expelled the Bantenese from collecting pepper at Silebar, Banten did not relinquish hopes of pressing its claim over the area. Hence, menteri Tsiliey Godong was commissioned in 1696 by Pangeran Kesatrian to investigate the state of affairs in Bengkulu. The report he wrote on returning to Banten was in cooperation with Harkis Baly, a resident of Bengkulu and former interpreter for the British who was in Banten on a private visit. The historical validity of the report, favourable to advancing Banten’s claim, may be evaluated with the benefit of local British reports.

The price paid for pepper by the British was indeed 12 Spanish dollars per bahar as Tsiliey Godong reported; but the ‘toll’ referred to was the commission of 1 dollar per bahar payable to the pangeran on pepper delivered by areas under their respective jurisdiction. It was in lieu of their now-relinquished right to impose hasil (export duty), a distinct feature of their customary authority, exercised for preferential or monopoly control over trade. The pangeran of Selibar was understandably reluctant to renounce a lucrative source of income derived from Silebar’s pre-eminence as the main centre for the export of southwest Sumatran pepper. The East India Company granted in a written settlement to him a compensatory annuity of only 400 Spanish dollars.[4] In addition to hereby securing transfer of the pangeran’s control over the pepper trade, the Company proceeded to impose port duties allowing him no share in the revenue.

The trade arrangements between the East India Company and Sumatran leaders appear to have weighed heavily in favour of the British, leaving shortfalls in local expectations, which the report represented as a loophole Banten might well exploit to assert its influence. The fact remained, however, that the British contracted a higher price in Spanish dollars for pepper,[5] compared to payments offered, often in rice and provisions by Chinese, Javanese and other traders, including those licensed by the ruler of Banten. Additionally, British presence promised security and stability, not guaranteed by the customary visit of Banten’s jenang (representative) every 2-3 years, essentially to make new appointments and claim taxes and tribute.[6]

The perceived injustices of the British in their dealings with the pangeran, portrayed in Tsiely Godong’sreport, supported Banten’s bid to expel the British, if necessary by force. Hence, close and accurate information on the layout of the British defences, including details of the fortification, were crucial and who better to provide such intelligence than Harkis Baly. However, it would appear that Dutch reluctance to offer military aid for fear of umbrage with the British ruled out renewed aggression. Instead, in response to the subsequent contracts the British made with Manna and Krue – areas to the south of Bengkulu – Sultan Mahassin Zainal Abidin (r. 1690-1733) tried a strategy of negotiation for asserting his claims. On the basis of intelligence brought to Banten by two Sumatrans, ‘Raja Tonkas and Malla’, a jenang was dispatched in 1729 to return the men and install them as local heads. On the same occasion, the jenang conveyed a letter from the Sultan offering the British the coast from Manna to Nassal (north of Krue), with full powers to administer the region, upon payment of 10,000 Spanish dollars. In response, the British returned the ambassador with a promise to refer the matter to the Directors and let the matter rest.[7]

Caution over extending British influence further south towards Krue soon changed given the repeated invitations for trade and settlement received from local chiefs, Banten’s weak control in the region and the absence of any Dutch claims in the area. But, above all, it was feared that British inaction would merely encourage Banten’s claims to the entire coast up to the borders of Inderapura. In 1742 the British occupied Pulau Pisang, an important southern point for pepper collection, but only some four year later did Banten stage a protest. The rumoured attack by the Bantenese Radin was followed by a letter from Sultan Arifin (r. 1733-48) threatening to appeal to the Dutch should the British fail to withdraw immediately. Returning the stock ‘civil answer’ that the matter would be referred to Europe,[8] the British successfully bought time which, in the event, saw the eruption of trouble in Banten, fanned by the political intrigues of the ruler’s wife, Ratu Sharifa Fatima, which culminated in the Banten Rebellion of 1751-52. [9]

By the time Banten entered Dutch vassalage in 1752, the proliferation of private trade involving Malay, Chinese, Buginese and European participation undermined the VOC’s claims over Banten’s major source of pepper from Lampung. Much of it entered British hands removing the need for further British expansion. By 1763, a stone planted by the VOC at Flat Point (Vlakke Hoek) in Semanka Bay firmed up the boundary between the two rival European powers, fulfilling their mutual desire to avoid conflict.[10] Semangka, which entered British hands during the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1780-84), was duly reoccupied in 1785. The exchange of the British Sumatran territories for Melaka, under the Anglo-Dutch treaty of 1824, finally settled contending claims over Bengkulu paving the way for its ultimate integration into modern Indonesia.



[1] J. Kathirithamby-Wells, The British West Sumatran Presidency (1760-85), Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1977, 21. For the respective interests of Banten, the British and the Dutch in Bengkulu see P. Wink, ‘Eenige Archief stukken betreffende de vestiging van de Engelsche factorij te Benkoelen in 1685’, TBG, 64 (1924): 461-3.

[2] Ibid., pp. 5-6; John Bastin, The British in West Sumatra (1685-1825), Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1965, xii-xvi, 1-12; British Library, India Office Records: East India Company Factory Records, Sumatra Factory Records, Vol. 2 (1685-1692), 6 Nov. 1686. For the text of the treaty, see H. Dodwell, Records of Fort St. George. Letters from Fort St. George for 1688, Madras: Government Press, 1919, vol. 3, 3 July 1685, 205-7.

[3] Bastin, The British in West Sumatra, 17, 20-6; Sumatran Factory Records, vol. 2, Benjamin Bloom to Karia Sutra Gistra, ? Jan. 1985.

[4] Bastin, The British in West Sumatra, 4, 37-8; Kathirithamby-Wells, The West Sumatran Presidency, 32.

[5] During the early years, when payment for pepper was offered in cloth and copper coins to meet the shortage in Spanish dollars, the Sumatrans showed their discontent by smuggling produce to other buyers, compelling the Bengkulu administration to establish silver as the linchpin of its monopoly.

[6] For Banten’s commercial relations with Silebar in the pre-British period see See J. Kathirithamby-Wells, ‘Banten: A West Indonesian Port and Polity’, in J. Kathirithamby-Wells and John Villiers, The Southeast Asian Port and Polity: Rise and Demise, Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1990, 116-17.

[7] Sumatra Factory Records, Vol. 8, 30 Oct. 1729.

[8] Sumatra Factory Records, Vol. 9, 28 July 1742.

[9] For an account of these events see Ota Atsushi, Changes of Regime and Social Dynamics in West Java: Society, State and the Outer World of Banten, 1750-1830, Leiden: Brill, 2006, 59-74.

[10] Kathirithamby-Wells, The West Sumatran Presidency, 139-40.

Jeyamalar Kathirithamby-Wells, “Report from the Minister of Banten Tsiely Godong and former translator of the English Harkis Baly concerning the English presence in Silebar and Bengkulu, West-Sumatra, 1696”. In: Harta Karun. Hidden Treasures on Indonesian and Asian-European History from the VOC Archives in Jakarta, document 12. Jakarta: Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, 2013.